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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
STOCKBROKERS' BANKRUPTCIES: PROBLEMS
CREATED BY THE CHANDLER ACTt
By JOHN A. GILCHRIST*
O NE Of the most difficult problems facing the draftsmen of the
recently enacted amendments1 to the Bankruptcy Act related
to stockbrokers' bankruptcies. Under the prior law which con-
tains no provision specifically dealing with proceedings involving
stockbrokers, the rights of the brokers' customers had been judi-
cially determined in accordance with widely divergent state laws.
Customers were ranked in a variety of classes depending on the
circumstances of their dealings with the bankrupt. Decisions on
this subject were consequently in hopeless conflict.
Sound administration of federal statutes depends largely upon
their uniform application. Where federal law rests on state
jurisprudence, uniformity is impossible. Therefore, the framers
of sec. 60e of the Chandler Act, as this recent legislation is known,
wisely intended2 to exclude the application of conflicting state
rules by formulating a scheme of distribution of the assets of
bankrupt stockbrokers based to a large extent, although not com-
pletely, on the so-called Massachusetts rule.
Designed to bring order out of chaos, sec. 60e constitutes a
great and desirable advance over the old law. Yet, while it lays to
rest old conflicts, it gives birth to new problems which issue
principally from the inconsistencies of the language of that sec-
tion, but also, to some extent, from its constitutional aspects.
A thorough understanding of the purpose, operation and effect
of sec. 60e is of vital importance to the investing public, and their
legal representatives, who wish to protect their rights in stock-
brokers' bankruptcies. Prerequisite to an analysis of that sec-
tion, however, is a brief consideration of the law which it was
intended to supplant.
*Of New York City; member of the New York and Missouri bars.
"Acknowledgment is made of the invaluable assistance received from
Mr. Paul Cleveland, former assistant professor of law at the University
of Chicago, now of New York City.
'Public-No. 696-75th Cong., approved June 22, 1938.
2Sec. 60e (5) specifically excludes the application of "the laws of any
state" from a determination of the rights of customers inter sese.
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CUSTOMERS' RIGHT OF RECLAMATION UNDER PRIOR LAW
Under the applicable state law two conflicting views developed
as to the trustee's title to stock which the broker had in his
possession or which he had repledged as security for loans at the
time of the bankruptcy.
By the so-called Massachusetts rule the broker in margin
transactions was regarded as the owner of the security purchased
on margin and his title thereto in general passed to the trustee.3
The Massachusetts courts looked upon the broker as carrying the
stock on an executory contract to purchase or sell, and held that
the relationship between him and his customer was that of creditor
and debtor.4 A similar debtor-creditor relationship was regarded
as extending to securities deposited by the customer with the
broker for use as margin. 5
However, this theory was not consistently applied in bank-
ruptcy cases; both state and federal decisions in Massachusetts
have held that, upon payment of the balance due, a customer who
had deposited stock as margin which was still identifiable, could
reclaim it upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of the broker.6 In
addition, the customer under the Massachusetts rule was re-
garded as the owner of securities delivered for safekeeping or
which, if purchased by the broker for the customer's account, had
been fully paid for and could be specifically identified by certificate
number, by tags attached to the certificate, or by similar means.
Although the Massachusetts rule treated the relationship be-
tween customer and broker as debtor and creditor, in practiceT it
3In re Swift, (D.C. Mass. 1900) 105 Fed. 493; In re Codman, (D.C.
Mass. 1922) 284 Fed. 273.4Chase v. Boston, (1902) 180 Mass. 458, 62 N. E. 1059; Crehan v.
Megargel (1920) 235 Mass. 279, 126 N . E. 477; Furber v. Dane, (1909)
203 Mass. 108, 89 N. E. 227; Papadopulos v. Bright, (1928) 264 Mass. 42,
161 N. E. 799; Palley v. Worcester County Nat'l Bank, (1935) 290 Mass.
501, 195 N. E. 717. But compare Lavien v. Norman, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1932)
55 F. (2d) 91, and Denton v. Gurnett & Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1934) 69
F. (2d) 750, in which the circuit court of appeals for the first circuit
allowed customers who had credit balances at the time of bankruptcy to
reclaim securities, originally deposited for margin, though reaffirming that
title to the stock remains in the broker until the stock is fully paid for.
IsCrehan v. Megargel, (1920) 235 Mass. 279, 126 N. E. 477; see Furber
v. Dane, (1909) 203 Mass. 108, 89 N. E. 227, 229-230.
GIn re Gay & Sturgis, (D.C. Mass, 1918) 251 Fed. 420; Leonard v.
Hunt, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 13; Furber v. Dane, (1909) 203
Mass. 108, 89 N. E. 227; Sutcliffe v. Cawley, (1921) 240 Mass. 231, 132
N. E. 406; Palley v. Worcester County Nat'l Bank, (1935) 290 Mass. 501,
195 N. E. 717.
As used throughout this discussion, "reclaim" means "recover prop-
erty belonging to the claimant or customer."
7To be sure, if the customer could not identify his stock and had not
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approached the so-called New York rule, which was the pre-
vailing view. Under the latter doctrine the broker was the agent
for the customer in purchasing or selling securities.8  In margin
transactions he became a pledgee as well.9 The customer was
regarded as the owner of the shares, if he could identify them as
his own, whether they had been delivered for safekeeping and
segregated, or delivered to the broker as margin or purchased by
the broker for the customer's account and held in pledge.10
Moreover, this ownership extended even to securities which the
customer could not identify by specific certificate number or which
had not been tagged with his name.".
fully paid therefor, the Massachusetts cases indicate that he could not re-
claim, but was in the position of a general creditor. (See footnote 4, supra.)
The federal bankruptcy cases, however, in the first circuit, though paying
lip service to the Massachusetts rule, which they were supposed to follow
(Bryant v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., (1909) 214 U. S. 279, 29 Sup.
Ct. 614, 53 L. Ed. 997), in fact tended to permit reclamation in cases
where it was difficult to see that the debtor-creditor relationship had ended
and title had passed to the customer. See Lavien v. Norman, (C.C.A. 1st
Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 91; Denton v. Gurnett & Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1934)
69 F. (2d) 750; Leonard v. Hunt, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 13.
Of course, if a specific certificate had been re-transferred and registered
in the customer's name, or if the customer could specifically identify his
stock by certificate number as stock allocated to him in the memorandum of
sale, or if a specific certificate had been segregated for him physically and
his name marked thereon, he was entitled to reclaim, if he had fully paid
for the stock. (See Lavien v. Norman, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d)
91; Denton v. Gurnett & Company, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 750.)
The recent cases, however, went even further and permitted a customer to
reclaim where he had a free credit balance even though he originally bought
on margin. One first circuit case went to the extent of holding that where
a customer had ordered certain utilities stock and that was the only order
in such stock given that month and the stock was found in the broker's
possession, unidentified by certificate number, unsegregated and held in a
"street name," nevertheless the customer could reclaim, upon tender of the
amount still due, even though he had not fully paid for the stock. Denton
v. Gurnett & Company, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 750. Another
recent case, presumably applying the Massachusetts rule, held that the rela-
tion of pledgor and pledgee, rather than creditor-debtor, existed with re-
spect to securities deposited with the broker for margin. Lavien v. Norman,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 91.8See Meyer, Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges (1931) sees. 39 and
41, and cases there cited.9Matter of Mercantile Trust Company, (1913) 210 N. Y. 83, 103 N. E.
884; Richardson v. Shaw, (1908) 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52 L. Ed.
835; Duel v. Hollins, (1916) 241 U. S. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. 615, 60 L. Ed.
1143. See Meyer, Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges (1931) sec. 41.
30 in re J. C. Wilson & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631; In re
Toole, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921) 274 Fed. 337; In re Meadows, Williams &
Co., (W.D. N.Y. 1909) 173 Fed. 694; Sexton v. American Trust Company,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 372.
S Richardson v. Shaw, (1908) 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52 L.
Ed. 835; Gorman v. Littlefield, (1913) 229 U. S. 19, 33 Sup. Ct. 690, 57
L. Ed. 1047; In re J. C. Wilson & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631;
Sexton v. American Trust Company, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 372.
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In order to reclaim his securities from the broker's trustee
in bankruptcy the customer had to be able to trace them.12 That is,
he had to find them among those in the possession of the bankrupt
or of the person to whom the broker had rehypothecated them. If
he could not trace he could not reclaim, and would be relegated
to his rights as a general creditor.1 3  Tracing, however, did not
require specific identification of particular certificates of stock
or of specific bonds. Securities were deemed sufficiently traced
if securities of the same kind were found in the possession of the
broker or of the broker's pledgee.14  Thus, the courts accepted
the business viewpoint that shares of stock, like bushels of wheat,
are fungible.15 The Supreme Court also felt that the broker
should be presumed not to have wrongfully disposed of his cus-
tomer's stock. Thus, when insolvency occurred, the customer
as owner of 100 shares of United States Steel could specifically
reclaim any 100 shares, provided the broker had enough of that
stock on hand to meet his obligations.
If the securities could be identified by certificate number, the
customer could reclaim them in full if they were found "in the
box," i.e., in the possession of the broker.1 6 If found in the pos-
session of the broker's pledgee, they could be reclaimed in full
subject to the "burden of the loan."'17
12Duel v. Hollins, (1916) 241 U. S. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. 512. 60 L. Ed.
1143; Gorman v. Littlefield, (1913) 229 U. S. 19, 33 Sup. Ct. 690, 57 L. Ed.
1047; In re Byrne (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 189; In re J. C.
Wilson & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631.
13In re Byrne, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 189.
"4See cases cited in footnote 12, supra.
15In Richardson v. Shaw, (1908) 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52
L. Ed. 835, Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
".... it is possible to say that after a purchase of stock is announced to a
customer he becomes an equitable tenant in common of all the stock of
that kind in the broker's hands, that the broker's powers of disposition, ex-
tensive as they are, are subject to the duty to keep stock enough on hand
to satisfy his customers' claims, and that the nature of the stock identifies
the fund as fully as a grain elevator identifies the grain for which receipts
are out."
26See cases cited in footnote 10, supra.
27"Burden of loan" is descriptive of a situation where the broker's
pledgee, after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, sells the securities of
some of the broker's customers and leaves the securities of other customers
unsold. In such cases the customers whose securities remain unsold should
have no greater rights than the customers whose securities were sold, and
such is the general rule. See Sexton v. American Trust Company, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 372; Vance Lumber Company v. Frazer, Goodwin
& Colver, (1921) 162 Wash. 347. 298 Pac. 438; In re James MacFarlane &
Co., (W.D. Wash. 1926) 14 Fed. (2d) 876; Duncan v. Johnston & Co.,(C.C.A. 6th C;r. 1925) 3 Fed. (2d) 422; In re J. C. Wilson & Co.,(S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631. But see In re T. A. McIntyre & Co.,(Appeal of Pippey), (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 955 (which has
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Securities which could not be traced by certificate number
but which were found in quantities sufficient to satisfy the de-
mands of all- claimants could also be reclaimed in full if found
"in the box."' 8 If found in the possession of the broker's pledgee,
such securities could be reclaimed in full, subject again to the
burden of the loan and also to the rights of creditors of a superior
class, if any such class existed. Typical of a superior class of
creditors were customers whose securities were wrongfully re-
pledged by the pledgee; such customers were given priority as
"Class A claimants" over those whose securities were rightfully
repledged, who were called "Class B claimants."'19 This priority
existed even when the Class B claimants had been able to trace
specific securities.
2
0
Securities which could not be traced by certificate number
and which were found in quantities insufficient to satisfy the de-
mands of all claimants to that particular kind of securities, if
found "in the box" could be reclaimed pro rata by the claimants
entitled to securities of that particular company and issue.2 1 If
found in the possession of the broker's pledgee they could be
reclaimed pro rata, again subject to "the burden of the loan" and
the rights of any superior class of creditors.22  Thus, the New
York rule, coupled with this doctrine of tracing, often permitted
some customers to fare well and others to fare poorly. 3
repeatedly been distinguished and disapproved) ; and also Leonard v. Hunt,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1929) 36 Fed. (2d) 13 (where the judge, in striving to
permit reclamation under the Massachusetts rule, completely lost sight of
this doctrine of ratable distribution).
If the proceeds of the pledged securities remaining after the pledgee
has satisfied his claims are insufficient to satisfy the demands of all claimants
of the same class, the securities which remain after the liquidation by the
pledgee are forced to contribute pro rata to those which did not survive
liquidation.
'SDuel v. Hollins, (1916) 241 U. . 523, 36 Sup. Ct. 615, 60 L. Ed.
1143; In re Hoyt, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 654; In re B. Solomon &
Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1920) 268 Fed. 108; In re J. C. Wilson & Co.,
(S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631; In re Pierson, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1916)
233 Fed. 519, as mod. 238 Fed. 142. See Lavien v. Norman, (C.C.A.
1st Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 91.
'
9Thomas v. Taggart, (1908) 209 U. S. 385, 28 Sup. Ct. 519, 52 L.
Ed. 845; In re J. C. Wilson & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631; In re
Mason, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1922) 282 Fed. 202; In re Irving Whitehouse Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 287.
20 1n re J. C. Wilson & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631; In re
Ennis, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1911) 187 Fed. 720.
2Duel v. Hollins, (1916) 241 U. S. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. 615, 60 L. Ed.
1143; In re J. C. Wilson & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1917) 252 Fed. 631; In re
Codman, Fletcher & Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 806.
2See cases cited in footnote 21, supra.
23Suppose a simple case: The broker, at the time of the bankruptcy,-
had on hand sufficient copper stock "in the box" to cover his commitments
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Where a customer had deposited, against a future purchase,
money with a broker who became bankrupt without executing the
order, the former was permitted to reclaim his property,24 or the
proceeds thereof, 25 if he could trace it,26 even under the Massa-
chusetts rule.2 7  And under the New York rule a customer was
permitted to reclaim cash shown to be the proceeds of the securi-
ties delivered by the claimant to the broker for sale.25
PRIMARY PURPOSE AND SCHEME OF ACT
The primary objective of the- draftsmen of sec. 60e of the
Chandler Act was to eliminate, as far as possible, the old classifica-
tions of customeis inter sese.2" Only "cash customers" who owe
to his customers who had dealt in copper stock. Those customers would
lose nothing. Those who had completely paid for their stock would be
entitled to the number of shares purchased. The margin customers would
be entitled to the shares which they had purchased on payment of the
amount due on their margin account. They would, in effect, be treated as
tenants in common and pledgors of the fungible mass of copper stock. If
there was only 90 per cent enough copper to satisfy the broker's commit-
ments, the copper customers shared pro rata in the amount on hand, thus
receiving a 90 per cent dividend, and became general creditors for their
remaining 10 per cent claim. On the other hand, suppose the broker had
no stock on hand or in pledge to cover his commitments to customers who
had dealt in a rail stock. These customers would be general creditors for
their full claims and might perhaps receive only a small dividend. Par-
ticular customers fared well or poorly, depending on the chance circum-
stances of whether or not the broker had much or little of the particular
stock in which they were interested at the date of bankruptcy.241n re Tracy, (S.D. N.Y. 1911) 185 Fed. 844.2 5Thus, where the broker deposited such money in his bank account,
the customer was entitled to satisfy his claim therefrom. In re Wettengel,
(C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 798; In re Ruskay, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1925)
5 F. (2d) 143; In re Shapiro Bros., (S.D. N. Y. 1923) 298 Fed. 196.
2 GIn re Brown, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1910) 185 Fed. 766; In re Pynchon,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1933) 63 Fed. (2d) 350. The circuit court of appeals
for the second circuit declared in In re Byrne, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 32
F. (2d) 189, 190:
"To get any standing, except as general creditors, they must identify
the original assets, or trace them into other specific funds which came into
the trustee's hands. It is not enough to show that they were converted by
the bankrupts, or indeed that they may have generally enriched their
estate."2 71n re Smith, (D.C. Mass. 1922) 278 Fed. 844.2 1n re Byrne, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 189. In Lavien v.
Norman, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 91, the circuit court of
appeals for the first circuit permitted a customer to reclaim cash represent-
ing the proceeds of securities purchased through the bankrupt on a cash
basis.
2 Since the draftsmen of the Chandler Act desired to eliminate the
old classifications of margin customers, they concentrated mainly upon
the rights of such customers and apparently, so far as the legislative docu-
ments bearing upon section 60e disclose, gave no deep consideration to
the rights of the customer who did not enter into margin transactions.
At the hearings before the House Committee on the judiciary, Mr.
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nothing for specifically identifiable securities, receive special treat-
ment under the new law; they are permitted to reclaim such
securities and thereby gain priority over other customers.
Harry Zalkin, who was a member of the Bankruptcy Conference and the
chief draftsman of sec. 60e, declared:
"Subdivision (e) has been added in order to make uniform the rules
applicable to the liquidation of the assets of bankrupt stockbrokers and to
secure greater approximation to equality in distribution, especially to
margin customers .... To secure practical equality for the margin customers,
the trustee must be put in a position other than that occupied by him under
the prevailing rule.
"Under 'e(2)' it is provided that cash customers unable to identify
their property, as prescribed in clause 4, shall be classified with margin
customers, and for the purpose of securing equality of treatment of margin
customers and such cash customers, they shall participate ratably in a
single and separate fund comprised of all property acquired by the broker
from the beginning of his insolvency from or for margin customers and
such cash customers. Under this subdivision the accounts of margin cus-
tomers and those of the cash customers who are unable to identify their
securities [will be] valued at market prices and the net equity determined by
deducting therefrom any debit balances, and on the basis of this net equity
they will participate pro rata in the distribution of the separate fund
created.
"In such matter there will be avoided the usual situation where cus-
tomers actually in the same class receive varying percentages out of the
same fund.
"Under the prevailing rule stocks are treated as fungible goods, hav-
ing 'no earmark which distinguishes one share from another, but is like
grain of a uniform quality in an elevator, one bushel being of the same
kind and value as another.' Accordingly, equality of distribution should
not be prevented by the chance circumstance that one margin customer may
be able to identify by number a certificate purchased for his account, when
as a matter of fact and practice no such significance is attached by the
broker to that particular piece of paper in his dealings. Clause 4 there-
fore provides that unless the certificate is specifically allocated or physically
set aside, it must be thrown into the fund for distribution to all cus-
tomers of the single class." (Hearings on H.R. 6439, House Com. on
Judic., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 96, 97.)
Mr. Zalkin's remarks were embodied in the House Report on this bill,
Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 31.
Professor James A. McLaughlin, another member of the Bankruptcy
Conference, declared at the same hearings:
"We are trying to put all these customers whose money has gone into
the security account of the broker in one boat and do away with the
present situation which, as I say in my article, involves discriminations
based on mere chance that are more appropriate to a beano party than to
the administration of justice." (Hearing on H.R. 6439, ibid., p. 127.)
The rights of "non-margin" customers were discussed by Professor
McLaughlin in Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act,
4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 369, 397-398:
"Even the so-called 'cash' customer who delivers his security for sale
to the broker and gets caught in a 'last day transaction' has in fact trusted
the general credit of the broker when he has not insisted upon the in-
stantaneous payment of cash against delivery and when he has taken no
steps to see that the proceeds of his transaction are segregated. The fact
that many brokers would not bother with a customer who made such unusual
requests merely means that it has become customary for persons dealing
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The framers of that statute did not, however, intend to rele-
gate other customers to the status of general creditors. Indeed,
sec. 60e bestows on customers, as a group, priority over other
creditors of the bankrupt broker by designating the former as a
"single and separate class of creditors" who are entitled to share
in a single and separate fund created by sec. 60e(2) and
then, if their claims are not satisfied therefrom, by permitting them
to participate in the general estate with general creditors. Thus,
customers receive better treatment under the new Act than under
the prior law which classified them as general creditors if they
were unable to trace their property. 30
In short, sec. 60e sets up a scheme of distribution by dividing
claimants into three classes: (1) cash customers, (2) all other
customers, and (3) general creditors. The operation of this sec-
tion is more clearly understood by considering, first, the fund
available to customers and, then, the persons entitled to share in
that fund.
A. The Single and Separate Fund.-This single and separate
fund is created by sec. 60e(2) which stipulates:
"All property3' at any time received, acquired or held by a
stockbroker from or for the account of customers, except cash
customers who are able to identify specifically their property
in the manner prescribed in paragraph (4) of this subdivision
and the proceeds of all customers' property rightfully transferred
or unlawfully converted by the stockbroker, shall constitute a
single and separate fund; and all customers except such cash
with stockbrokers to allow the stockbroker to throw their securities and
money into a common pot....
"If one approaches the problem from the point of view of customers,
it is indisputable that the different degrees in which different customers
trust the broker run through such a wide range that many possible dis-
tinctions might logically be taken. At the same time it is abundantly
clear that the existing law turns upon refinements utterly unintelligible to
the business man and involves elements of chance more appropriate to a
beano party than to the administration of justice. If the problem be ap-
proached from the point of view of ease and economy of administration,
the solution of the Chandler Bill warrants a high rating. Apart from
weaknesses that may lurk in the imperfections of draftsmanship inevitably
to be suspected when attempt is made at a partial codification of law gov-
erning complicated commercial transactions, the Bill is probably most vud-
nerable to temperate criticism from the point of view of those who wotdd
insist upon priority for cash customers who are diligent in seeing that their
cash transactions are executed. As Mr. Glenn has sagely remarked, how-
ever, any reasonable mnan oight to know that a broker's office is no place
to leave inonry or securities for safe-keeping." (Italics added.)301n re Byrne, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 189.
31Section 60e(l) declares, inter alia, that:
"'Property' shall include cash, securities, whether or not negotiable,
and all other property of similar character; . .."
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customers shall constitute a single and separate class of creditors,
entitled to share ratably in such fund on the basis of their respec-
tive net equities as of the date of bankruptcy: Provided, however,
That such fund shall to the extent approved by the court be sub-
ject to the priority of payment of the costs and expenses enumer-
ated in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this
Act. If such fund shall not be sufficient to pay in full the claims
of such class of creditors, such creditors shall be entitled, to the
extent only of their respective unpaid balances, to share in the
general estate with the general creditors."
Some confusion, with respect to the property to be included
in this fund, is caused by the punctuation in this paragraph. Be-
cause of the insertion of a comma after "customers" in the second
line and after "stockbroker" in the sixth line and because of
the failure to insert a comma after "subdivision" in the fourth line,
it might be urged that the fund in which customers are entitled
to share would not include the "proceeds of all customers' property
rightfully transferred or unlawfully converted by the stockbroker"
and that customers whose property was so transferred or converted
should be relegated to the position of general creditors.
Such an interpretation of paragraph (2) cannot be sustained
by sound reasoning and is completely refuted by the provision
contained in .paragraph (4),32 and by the legislative history of this
paragraph. 33
Consequently, since the single and separate fund shall con-
sist of "All property at any time received, acquired or held by a
32Paragraph (4) provides, inferentially, that property received by a
stockbroker, and any substitute therefor or proceeds thereof shall con-
stitute part of the fund for all customers unless such property should re-
main in its identical form "or unless such property or any substitutes there-
for or the proceeds thereof were, more than four months before bankruptcy
or at a time while the stockbroker was solvent, allocated to or physically
set aside for such customer, and remained so allocated or set aside at the
date of bankruptcy."
-
3The Chandler Bill when first introduced, H.R. 12889, provided merely
that "All property at any time acquired or received by a stockbroker from
or for the account of margin customers, or from customers whose property
has been converted by a stockbroker, or from cash customers, who are
unable to identify their property in manner as prescribed in clause (4) of
this subdivision, shall constitute a single and separate fund." Substantially
the same provision was contained in H. R. 6439. By this provision the
single and separate fund would include all property received by the stock-
broker from customers except property which would be identified as be-
longing to cash customers. In H.R. 8046, section 60e(2) first appeared
in form substantially like the section as enacted. In that Bill, as of July
28, 1937, no comma was inserted after "subdivision" nor in that Bill as of
August 9, 1937. However, in that Bill as of April 20, 1938, a comma
was inserted after "subdivision" and the comma was retained in the Bill
up to and including June 11, 1938. However, the comma was omitted when
the Bill was passed.
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stockbroker from or for the account of customers . . . and the
proceeds of all customers' property rightfully transferred or un-
lawfully converted by the stockbroker,"34 it is necessary to trace
the customers' property in order to bring it within this fund. In
order to accord customers, as a class, priority over general credi-
tors, it would seem that the proceeds of such property need only
be traced in substantially the same manner as in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings prior to the enactment of this new law.
In addition, paragraph (5) gives the trustee the right to re-
cover, for the benefit of the single and separate fund, property
conveyed by the stockbroker which would otherwise have consti-
tuted part of such fund where such fund is not otherwise suffi-
cient to pay the claims of the single and separate class,3" and there-
by abrogates the rule of Richardson v. Shaw.3"
Whenever any property remains after liquidation of a pledge
made by the bankrupt, it is, by force of paragraph (3), apportioned
between this fund and the general estate in the proportion in which
customers' property and the bankrupt's general property con-
tributed to the pledge.:" The manner of tracing property, for this
purpose, should also be similar to that which existed under the
former law.
34Paragraph (2); underscoring added.3rParagraph (5) stipulates:
"Where such single and separate fund is not sufficient to pay in full
the claims of such single and separate class of creditors, a transfer by a
stockbroker of any property which, except for such transfer, would have
been a part of such fund may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit
of such fund, if such transfer is voidable or void under the provisions of this
Act. For the purpose of such recovery, the property so transferred shall
be deemed to have been the property of the stockbroker and, if such trans-
fer was made to a customer or for his benefit, such customer shall be
deemed to have been a creditor, the laws of any state to the contrary not-
withstanding. If any securities received or acquired by a stockbroker
from a cash customer are transferred by the stockbroker, such customer
shall not have any specific interest in or specific right to any securities of
like kind on hand at the time of bankruptcy, but such securities of like
kind or the proceeds thereof shall become part of such single and separate
fund; Provided, however, That a customer shall have a specific title to
securities (a) which have been physically set aside by a stockbroker, more
than four months before his bankruptcy or while solvent, in safekeeping
for such customer, and so retained until the date of bankruptcy, regardless
of the name in which such securities are registered, or (b) which a stock-
broker, more than four months before his bankruptcy or while solvent,
caused to be registered in the name of such customer."
The reference in paragraph (5) to transfers "voidable or void under
the provisions of this Act" is to section 60a and b, which relates to prefer-
ences, and to sections 67d and 70e, which relate to fraudulent conveyances.
:30(1908) 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52 L. Ed. 835.37Under the former rule, upon the liquidation of a bankrupt broker's
loans, his own property was first used, and then that of his customers, in
satisfaction of the loan. See In re Gay & Sturgis, (D.C. Mass. 1918)
251 Fed. 420.
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Paragraph (2) excepts from this fund the property of "cash
customers," (defined by paragraph (1) as "customers entitled to
immediate possession of such securities without the payment of any
sum to the stockbroker"),3 8 which they can reclaim when they
"are able to identify specifically their property in the manner
prescribed in paragraph (4) of this subdivision." Coordinately,
paragraph (2) excludes such cash customers from the "single
and separate class of creditors." The definition of "net equity,"
contained in paragraph (1), also indicates that only securities
are reclaimable.
Yet paragraph (4), to which reference is made in paragraph
(2), seems to be irreconcilably conflicting with paragraph (2)
with respect to a customer's right to withdraw cash from this
fund by reclaiming it. As provided by paragraph (4), "No cash
received by a stockbroker from or for the account of a customer
[as distinguished from a "cash customer" mentioned in the same
sentence] 39 for the purchase or sale of securities . . . or any sub-
stitutes therefor or the proceeds thereof, shall for the purposes of
this subdivision e be deemed to be specifically identified ... 
unless the conditions,40 outlined in that paragraph, are satisfied.
Though stated negatively, paragraph (4) would seem to per-
mit a person who delivered cash to a broker against a future pur-
chase, or who delivered securities which were sold, to reclaim
his money if he can meet the requirements of that paragraph. Yet
such person, not being entitled to immediate possession of securi-
ties and therefore not a "cash customer,"'4 1 is denied the right to
3SParagraph (1) also declares that:
. . . the same person may be a cash customer with reference to
certain securities and not a cash customer with reference to other securi-
ties; . . ."
3 9A possible implication arising from this provision is that a "cus-
tomer" as well as a "cash customer" is given the right to trace and re-
claim cash which he has delivered to a stockbroker in accordance with
the provisions of this paragraph.40Paragraph (4) states:
"No cash received by a stockbroker from or for the account of a
customer for the purchase or sale of securities, and no securities or similar
property received by a stockbroker from or for the account of a cash cus-
tomer for sale and remittance or pursuant to purchase or as collateral se-
curity, or for safekeeping, or any substitutes therefor or the proceeds thereof,
shall for the purposes of this subdivision e be deemed to be specifically
identified, unless such property remained in its identical form in the stock-
broker's possession until the date of bankruptcy, or unless such property
or any substitutes therefor or the proceeds thereof were, more than four
months before bankruptcy or at a time while the stockbroker was solvent,
allocated to or physically set aside for such customer, and remained so
allocated or set aside at the date of bankruptcy."41Section 60e(1).
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trace his property by paragraph (2) which impliedly gives that
right only to a "cash customer." 42 By paragraph (2) the property
of such customer constitutes part of the single and separate fund;
by paragraph (4) it belongs entirely to the customer if he can
identify it.
It would seem exceedingly difficult to solve the impasse created
by paragraphs (2) and (4) on the basis of any construction which
would give effect to the language of the entire section. A court
might hold that the provisions of paragraph (2) are dominant.
Under this construction only the identifiable securities of cash
customers could be reclaimed. Such a construction would render
meaningless a large portion of the language of paragraph (4).
On the other hand, a court might hold that the provisions of the
latter paragraph are dominant and must be read into paragraph
(2). Such a construction would carve out another exception to
the property going into the single and separate fund; the "specifi-
cally identifiable" cash of ordinary customers, as well as the
"specifically identifiable" securities of cash customers, could be
reclaimed. 43
It would be less of a departure from prior law to adopt the
latter position and accord a right to trace property to customers
other than cash customers. Such a construction would eliminate
some of the possible constitutional objections and many of the
harsh results which will be subsequently considered.
No matter how these two paragraphs are construed, sec. 60e
may be open to certain constitutional objections. First, it may
42See paragraph (2) and discussion on p. 62, supra.43To harmonize these two paragraphs it might be urged that para-
graph (4) is intended to determine not only the property which a cash
customer may reclaim but also the property which belongs to the single
and separate fund; that only property which can be specifically identified,
by the tests prescribed by that paragraph, as belonging to a customer, goes
into the single and separate fund.
This construction, however, would be contrary to the intention of its
draftsmen who intended that property which a cash customer could not
specifically identify under the requirements of paragraph (4) should fall
into the single and separate fund if it was received by the bankrupt from
or for the account of the former. (See quotation from Mr. Zalkin's re-
marks before the House Committee, footnote 29, supra.) This indicates
that it was intended that property may belong to the fund under para-
graph (2) even though a particular customer could not have reclaimed it
under the requirements of paragraph (4). Further, such a construction
would be contrary to the underlying purpose of the section to give priority
to customers over general creditors.
Indeed, such a construction would create an absurd result, for securi-
ties or similar property, as distinguished from cash, received by a broker
from or for the account of a customer, could not go into the single and
separate fund.
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authorize an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law since, under any construction, it grants customers
only a restricted right of reclamation. Second, it may overstep
the federal bankruptcy power by attempting to distribute prop-
erty not owned by the bankrupt. These objections blend to a
great extent.
Suppose, for example, that a customer delivered money to a
broker with an order to purchase certain stock at a definite price;
that the broker immediately deposited that money in a special
bank account for customers and became bankrupt before execut-
ing the order; that, by state law, the broker would be deemed a
trustee of that money for the customer. Since the customer is
not a "cash customer" and since his property has probably not
remained in its "identical form" within the meaning of paragraph
(4), sec. 60e would seem to deny him the right to reclaim his
money from that bank account and to declare it to be part of the
single and separate fund.
The Supreme Court has declared that the "bankruptcy power,
like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject
to the fifth amendment. '44 In so far as sec. 60e denies a customer
the right to reclaim his property, to which he has a right under
state law, and gives that property to members of the single and
separate class, it would seem to constitute a taking of property
without due process of law.
Further, this provision would seem to exceed the federal
bankruptcy power. The scope of that power, one of the purposes
of which is to effect a distribution of a bankrupt's property, should
be restricted to the property of the bankrupt. Where, under state
law, the bankrupt never had an interest in property of a third
person, it would seem that the bankruptcy power cannot be util-
ized to transfer such property to a bankrupt, or his representa-
tive, merely because the third person had certain dealings with the
bankrupt.4
5
44Louisville Bank v. Radford, (1935) 295 U. S. 555, 589, 55 Sup. Ct.
854, 79 L. Ed. 1593. See also Wright v. Vinton Branch, (1937) 300 U. S.
440, 456, 57 Sup. Ct. 556, 81 L. Ed. 736; Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co.,(1937) 299 U. S. 445, 451, 57 Sup. Ct. 298, 81 L. Ed. 340; and Con-
tinental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., (1935) 294 U. S. 648, 680, 55 Sup. Ct.
595, 79 L. Ed. 1110.45True, the general doctrine of preferences may invalidate transfers,
valid under state law, and thereby transfer title to the representative of the
bankrupt, but in all such cases the property affected belonged to the bank-
rupt when he was insolvent. Under Section 70 the bankruptcy trustee is
vested with the title to property owned by the bankrupt at the time of the
petition or transferred by him under certain conditions which make the
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B. The Single and Separate Class of Creditors.-To qualify
as a member of the "single and separate class of creditors entitled
transfer voidable either as a preference or as a fraudulent conveyance.
This section contemplates that property, passing to the trustee, be owned
at some point of time by the bankrupt.
It it well settled that property which the bankrupt held as trustee
does not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy. United States Nat'l Bank in
Johnstown, Pa. v. Blauner's Affiliated Stores, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1935) 75
F. (2d) 826; In re Finkelstein, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 278;
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Stewart, (W.D.S.C.
1935) 12 F. Supp. 186; In re Kenney & Greenwood, (D.C. Me. 1928) 23
F. Supp. 681. See Cunningham v. Brown, (1924) 265 U. S. 1, 11, 44 Sup.
Ct. 424, 68 L. Ed. 873.
If the identifiable property of third persons does not pass to the bank-
ruptcy trustee and hence should not be administered by him, there should
be no justification for distributing identifiable property of customers among
all customers as a class.
Consequently, if section 60e is construed to deny a customer the right
to reclaim money which he delivered, with a "buy" order which was not
executed, where such money remains earmarked in the possession of the
bankrupt broker (who is deemed, under state law, to be trustee thereof
for such customer), that section would seem to be unconstitutional for
the reasons already stated. This objection can be avoided by construing
paragraph (4) as governing paragraph (2) so as to permit reclamation
of cash remaining in the possession of the bankrupt in the identical form
in which it was delivered to him by the claimant. There is no difficulty as
to reclamation of securities delivered by a customer for sale and remain-
ing in their original form in the bankrupt's possession since the former,
being a cash customer, can clearly reclaim his property.
Where a customer has delivered money for a future purchase to a
broker who immediately deposited it in a special bank account for cus-
tomers or where such money was directly used to purchase, for such cus-
tomer, securities, and these securities (or securities delivered to a broker
for future sale), have been immediately placed in bulk segregation, discussed
hereafter at p. , (and such property remains in its converted form at
the date of bankruptcy), under state law the broker may be regarded as
trustee of the proceeds of the customer's property. Yet section 60e, no
matter how paragraphs (2) and (4) are construed, denies such customer
the right to reclaim such proceeds except under certain conditions.
Where property deposited by the customer with the broker has been
changed into another form, rightfully or wrongfully, by the broker, it
might be urged that there is no constitutional objection to denying a cus-
tomer the right to reclaim. This argument would run: In this situation
it is not original property which the customer seeks to reclaim, but its pro-
ceeds; the right to trace and recapture property converted into another
form is not substantive, but merely a remedial right extended by equity
courts; therefore, in so far as Section 60e denies the customer a right
to trace and reclaim the proceeds of property which he delivered to the
bankrupt broker, it does not violate the Fifth Amendment which protects
only substantive rights. It is not clear that this argument should succeed
since a right to trace proceeds of property, in this connection, is predicated
on the theory that the bankrupt at no time acquired title to such property
or the proceeds thereof; if this be so, the objections already considered are
here applicable.
Of course, in so far as a customer seeks to reclaim "substitutes" for,
as distinguished from "proceeds" of, his property, the restrictions im-
posed by Section 60e would seem unobjectionable. Substitution contemplates
that the customer's original property, or the proceeds thereof, is gone and
that it is being replaced with different property. Such substitution would
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to share ratably in such [single and separate] fund," a customer
is not required to trace his property, whether cash or securities,
into such fund. In other words, if a person was at any time a
customer of the bankrupt, he would be entitled to share in that
fund since sec. 60e(2) expressly stipulates that "all customers
except such cash customers shall constitute a single and separate
class of creditors."
Conceivably, it might be urged that, since "customers" are
defined by sec. 60e(1) as including "persons who have claims
on account of securities received, acquired or held by the stock-
broker from or for the account of such persons" for various pur-
poses, and "shall include persons who have claims against the
stockbroker arising out of sales or conversions of such securi-
ties,' 46 a person cannot participate in the single and separate fund
on account of a claim for cash which the former delivered to the
latter.
Such an argument should be rejected. In defining "customers"
,paragraph (1) states, inter alia, "customers of a stockbroker shall
include" the specified persons already referred to. The word "in-
clude" is essefitially a word of enlargement, not of restriction 47 and
effect should be given, in paragraph (2), to this quality of en-
largement in order to include customers whose claims arise in
respect of cash delivered to brokers by customers s.4
be made from the broker's property and not from property to which such
customer was always entitled.
By mere definition Congress cannot take away vested rights without
due process of law. For this reason, paragraph (5), (stipulating that
property "shall be deemed to have been property of the stockbroker" which
would not, under state law, have belonged to him), may not be effectual.
Desirable as it may be to create a uniform law governing the rights of
stockbrokers and customers, it cannot be done under federal legislation of
this kind unless justified on the basis of bankruptcy power. That there is
no federal substantive law, except that arising under the powers granted
to Congress, is indicated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304
U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188.
46Section 60e(1) declares that:
'... customers' of a stockbroker shall include persons who have claims
on account of securities received, acquired or held by the stockbroker from
or for the account of such persons (a) for safekeeping or (b) with a
view to sale or (c) to cover consummated sales or (d) pursuant to pur-
chases or (e) as collateral security or (f) by way of loans of securities by
such persons to the stockbroker, and shall include persons who have claims
against the stockbroker arising out of sales or conversions of such securi-
ties. .... "4 7The Supreme Court held, in American Surety Co. v. Marotta, (1933)
287 U. S. 513, 53 Sup. Ct. 260, 77 L. Ed. 466, that the word "include" as
used in section la(9) (which declared that "creditor" shall "include" any-
one who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy) is a word of
"extension or enlargement" rather than one of "lim;ation or enumeration."
48Further, the legislature clearly intended to abolish any distinction
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Whether customers, other than cash customers, are excluded
from the single and separate class if they can specifically identify
their property depends on the answer to the question raised by
the conflict, already mentioned, 49 between paragraphs (2) and
(4). If paragraph (2) controls, such customers are included in
the single and separate class; per contra, if paragraph (4)
governs.
Customers are entitled to participate in the single and separate
fund "on the basis of their respective net equities as of the date of
bankruptcy."50  A customer's "net equity" is determined by "ex-
cluding any specifically identifiable securities reclaimable by the
customer and by subtracting the indebtedness of the customer to
the stockbroker from the sum which would have been owing by
the stockbroker to the customer had the stockbroker liquidated,
by sale or purchase on the date of bankruptcy, the remaining se-
curities or security commitments of the customer."'"
If customers cannot satisfy their claims in full from the
single and separate fund, they are entitled to share, to the extent
of their unpaid balances, in the general estate with general credi-
tors.52
PROBLEMS RELATING TO RIGHT OF CUSTOMERS TO RECLAIM
SECURITIES
The complex problems of construction, raised by sec. 60e,
relate solely to a customer's right to reclaim money. That sec-
between margin customers and include all of them in one class whether
they could trace their property into securities which the stockbroker pos-
sessed at the date of his bankruptcy or not. If, therefore, a person who
had originally deposited securities or for whom securities were purchased
by the stockbroker, is entitled to share in the single and separate fund
even if he cannot trace any of his property into it, a person, who has
deposited cash for the purchase of securities with the stockbroker which
he cannot trace at the date of bankruptcy, should have an equal right to
participate in that fund.
The acceptance of a contrary interpretation would achieve this ridicu-
lous result: If the stockbroker converted the cash originally deposited by
a customer, the latter could not share in the single and separate fund; if
the stockbroker utilized the cash so deposited to acquire securities for the
customer and then converted the securities, the customer would thereupon
be classified with the single and separate group.
The conversion of cash arising from the sale of securities deposited
with the broker would clearly bring the customer within the definition of
"customer" set forth in 60e(I), since he would be a person who had a
claim against the stockbroker "arising out of sales or conversions of such
securities."
49See discussion at p. 62, supra. The possible constitutional objection
to these paragraphs has also been considered at pp. 62-63, supra.
oParagraph (2), pp. 59-60, supra.
"Paragraph (1).
5-Paragraph (2), pp. 59-60, supra.
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tion, however, clearly prescribes the right of a customer to re-
capture securities. Consequently the principal question,r 3 relat-
ing to this latter right, will be: what constitutes a specific identifi-
cation of securities within the meaning of paragraph (4). That
problem requires a consideration of the extent, and methods, of
segregation of customers' securities by stockbrokers.
It has been the practice of brokers, in order to facilitate the
reclamation of wholly owned or excess margin securities (which,
by the rules of some stock exchanges, can not be repledged by the
broker), to segregate such securities in some way. The various
methods of setting aside such securities can be generally classified
as either specific or bulk segregation.
There are several ways of specifically segregating securities.
In the first place, wholly owned securities, such as those deposited
by a customer with a broker for safekeeping, may be physically
set aside and tagged with the customer's name. Securities pur-
chased by the broker and fully paid for, or securities constituting
excess margin, may be identified either by certificate number" or
by the broker's physically setting them aside in an envelope or box,
bearing the customer's name, or by his tagging the particular
certificate.
It is primarily a question of fact whether securities which do
not remain in their identical form have been sufficiently allocated
to or physically set aside for a customer so that he may reclaim
them under paragraph (4). The practices, above described,
would seem to meet the requirements of that paragraph so that a
cash customer may reclaim his securities so segregated.
In addition to these methods of specific identification for rec-
lamation purposes many brokers have adopted the practice of
segregating securities in bulk. Under this practice, shares of
stock are regarded as completely fungible. The broker -places in
a box certificates totaling the amount of all shares of a particular
stock which have been fully paid for or which constitute excess
margin. Each customer's interest in this fungible mass is repre-
sented by a "requisition card" showing how many shares of a
particular stock belong to him, although specific certificates are
not identified as his. When the margin clerk requires additional
margin for a particular customer's account, a "removal card" is
53The question of the constitutionality of section 60e, in this connec-
tion, has been considered in footnote 45, supra.
54This is the usual practice where orders are executed for out-of-town
brokers; in such cases, telegraphic notification to such brokers of the pur-
chases would list the certificate numbers.
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placed in the box, to show that the latter's stock has been re-
moved, and shares to that amount are thereupon taken from the
box. This system, which facilitates the substitution and with-
drawal of certificates by the broker, makes the customers, dealing
in a particular security, tenants in common of the mass of such
securities in the box.-
Since securities are put into bulk segregation only when a
customer's securities are fully paid for or constitute excess mar-
gin, a customer for whom such segregation has been made, should
be regarded as a cash customer and entitled to reclaim from the
segregated mass of securities if he can meet the requirements of
paragraph (4). Yet this conclusion is not free from doubt. It
might be argued that segregation must be made only for an indi-
vidual customer, rather than a group of customers, since paragraph
(4) provides that cash or securities are "specifically unidentifiable"
only when set aside for "such customer." That construction,
however, does not seem meritorious.58
When securities are placed in bulk segregation, whatever right
a cash customer may have had to a particular certificate terminates.
In exchange therefor, he acquires an undivided interest, pro tanto,
in the segregated mass. Consequently, he can not reclaim any
portion of that mass on a theory that his original property has
remained in its "identical form," within the meaning of para-
graph (4). He may only lay claim to that mass as, pro tanto,
representing the proceeds of, or substitutes for, his property.
Under the restrictions of paragraph (4), however, such cus-
tomer is entitled to reclaim his share of the segregated mass only
in so far as securities were placed17 therein for his account four
55This would clearly be the result under the old New York rule and,
moreover, under the old Massachusetts rule it would be regarded as a
sufficient appropriation of the securities to pass title to the customer as a
tenant in common. See Denton v. Gurnett & Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1934)
69 F. (2d) 750.
It is well settled that a customer is bound by the rules, regulations,
customs and usages of a stock exchange. (See Meyer, Stock Brokers and
Stock Exchanges (1931) sec. 27 and cases therein cited.) Therefore, a
customer must be deemed to have consented to, and accepted, this right of
tenant in common to the segregated mass, wherever bulk segregation is
customarily employed.56True, paragraph (4) permits reclamation only where the segregation
was made "for such customer." That phrase, however, should not prohibit
reclamation where the segregation was made for customers as tenants in
common. The use of the singular designation, "such customer," is ob-
viously intended to describe the person seeking reclamation, not the char-
acter of his interest in the property sought to be recaptured.57See footnote 75 infra. Although araaraih (4) permits a customer to
reclaim the substitutes for, or proceeds of, his property where such were
"allocated to or physically set aside" for him more than four months be-
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months before the broker's bankruptcy or at a time when the
latter was solvent. 8 Such customer can not reclaim anything
from this mass on account of securities placed therein within four
months of the broker's bankruptcy and when the latter was in-
solvent. 9 That portion of the mass which represents securities
of customers segregated during this latter period, belongs to the
single and separate fund.
Where only a part of the segregated securities can be reclaimed
by the customers for whom they were set apart, the entire segre-
gated mass constitutes, in essence, a fund held by the broker partly
for the benefit of such customers and partly for the single and
separate class of customers. It follows, therefore, that any loss
to that fund, such as might result from the misappropriations of the
broker, should be borne equally by such customers and the single
and separate class in proportion to their respective interests
therein.6 0
fore bankruptcy or at a time while the broker was solvent, paragraph (5)
states, inter alia, that a customer shall have specific title to securities
which were "physically set aside" for him under the conditions just de-
scribed. By omitting any reference to securities "allocated to" such cus-
tomer, paragraph (5) seems more narrow than the preceding paragraph
and would not permit a customer to keep securities "allocated" to him
by certificate number prior to four months of bankruptcy but delivered
to him within that period. It seems probable that paragraph (4) would
control, since title would have passed to such customer under that para-
graph at the date of allocation. At any rate, such conflict has no effect on
the problem of reclamation under bulk segregation which requires a physical
"setting aside."58To this extent bulk segregation should be valid and effective under
section 60e. It can be argued that this practice does not violate the spirit
of that section which was primarily designed to prohibit only a tenancy in
common in a general mass of securities of a particular kind (1) held by a
broker "in the box" and unsegregated or (2) repledged by that broker;
that the'draftsmen of that statute intended merely to eliminate the old
priorities which were based only on the chance existence of certain stock
in the possession of the bankrupt or upon wrongful dealing by the broker
in such stock, not upon a systematic method of safeguarding the rights of
customers in wholly owned- or excess margin securities by setting aside cer-
tain stock for particular customers. See footnote 29 supra. Certainly it
seems desirable to protect these rights of customers.59In so far as purchased, or excess margin, securities are involved, this
result would seem proper, since the customer has relied upon the broker's
general credit. Where securities, delivered by a customer for delayed sale,
are involved, the broker may be deemed a trustee of such securities under
state law. Consequently, in this case there may be a constitutional objec-
tion to this paragraph, in so far as it denies such customer the right to
reclaim the proceeds of his property. See footnote 45, supra.
6OThis conclusion is sound under ordinary principles of the law of
trusts which hold that where a trustee wrongfully diverts part of a fund
representing two trust res, the trusts must bear the loss pro rata. See
footnote, 78, infra.
Further, a similar result was reached under the prior law relating to
reclamation in bankruptcy. See footnote 21, supra.
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PROBLEMS RELATING TO RIGHT OF CUSTOMERS TO
RECLAIM MONEY
A customer's right to demand money from his broker's estate
may arise in several ways. A person who engages only in cash
transactions, as distinguished from margin or running accounts,61
may deliver cash 2 against a future purchase to his broker who
becomes a bankrupt before the order can be executed, or such
person may deliver securities for sale to the broker who effects
the sale but becomes bankrupt before delivering the proceeds
thereof to the customer. A margin customer may deposit money
on account or may acquire a credit balance as credits and debits
are balanced from time to time. A "free credit balance," as a
customer's right to demand cash from a broker is termed, by
hypothesis represents a right to cash, not to securities.
All customers who have claims against a bankrupt stock-
broker for money, whether it represents the customers' deposits
or the proceeds of sales of customers' securities, would seem to be
forced into the single and separate class."3
To hold that paragraph (2) controls to deny a customer a
right to reclaim money may achieve a harsh result in some cases.
For example, a customer may engage in but one transaction with
a broker, whereby the former delivers money to the latter accom-
panied by an order to buy certain stock at several points below
the then market price. Before the order can be executed, the
eiThe nature of the relationship between customer and broker may be
different in these two transactions. A person engaging in isolated or cash
transactions may be unwilling, and consequently may not intend, to trust
to the credit of the broker, so that a trust relationship may arise; where
a person has a margin or running account with the broker, he may intend
to rely upon the credit of the broker so that a creditor-debtor relation
arises.
As is indicated in footnote 29, supra, the draftsmen of section 60e ap-
parently intended that the relationship of broker to customer be regarded
as debtor-creditor in all cases, as far as the rights of customers inter sese
are involved, state law to the contrary notwithstanding.
62Cash, as the word is used herein, may include checks or other negoti-
able instruments which are commonly regarded as money.
03Not being "cash customers" as defined by paragraph (1), they are
not entitled, by paragraph (2), to trace and reclaim their money. The
conflict, in this connection, between paragraphs (2) and (4) has already
been considered, beginning at p. 20, supra. The solution of this problem is
of vital importance to customers who seek to reclaim cash. If paragraph(2) is controlling, they have no right to recapture their money; if para-
graph (4) governs, they may reclaim their money if they can meet the
requirement set forth in that paragraph for specifically identifying their
funds.
As already stated, "customers," as defined in paragraph (1), embraces
persons who have a claim against the bankrupt for cash delivered against
a future purchase. See discussion at p. 66, supra.
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broker becomes bankrupt. He may have held the customer's
money earmarked or may have, immediately upon its receipt,
deposited such money in a special account for customers where
the proceeds of the money remain at the time of bankruptcy. By
the strict language of paragraph (2), this customer, not being a
"cash customer," will be unable to reclaim his money and will
be only entitled to share pro rata with other customers in the single
and separate fund. 4
An argument against the foregoing result might conceivably
be based upon a construction of the definition of "customers," as
set forth in paragraph (1),65 -which would hold that the person
who deposited the money in the assumed case never became a
"customer," is, therefore, not affected by the provisions of para-
graph (2), and may consequently rely on his right to trace his
property under the old law, unaffected by the limitations con-
tained in Section 60e.6
6
Such a contention, however, should have little force in light of
the proper construction of paragraph (1) which attrih5utes to the
word "include" a quality of enlargement, rather than restriction,
to embrace persons such as the one described in the assumed
case.6 7  As a matter of fact, a contrary construction would work
to the disadvantage of such person in a case where he was unable
to trace his money, for then, not being classified as a "creditor,"
he would be relegated to the status of general creditor and pre-
cluded from participation in the single and separate fund.
It might be argued that the draftsmen of sec. 60e intended
merely to adopt the Massachusetts rule which only governs margin
transactions and which would permit the person in the assumed
case to recover his funds.68 All legislative documents, however,
indicate that the draftsmen intended to go beyond the Massa-
chusetts doctrine, in this connection, and to put all customers in
08This is similar to the result reached under bulk segregation of se-
curities, already considered. The possible constitutional objections to sec-
tion 60e in so far as it denies customers the right to reclaim their prop-
erty has already been considered at pp. 62-63, supra.6fSee footnote 46, supra.
66That section was not designed to eliminate the right of the broker's
other creditors to trace their funds; and that section bars a customer's right
to trace his property only as against other customers, not as against gen-
eral creditors. See discussion at p. 59, supra.67See discussion at p. 66, supra.
OBIt was held by the federal district court in Massachusetts, in In re
Smith, (D.C. Mass. 1922) 278 Fed. 844, that where a customer delivered
a check to a broker for a purchase of stock which was never consummated,
the former could reclaim the proceeds of the check from the bankrupt's
general bank account.
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the same class irrespective of the circumstances of their dealings
with the broker."" In effect, sec. 60e would seem to constitute a
legislative fiat that all persons who engage in stock transactions
with a broker must be deemed to have relied upon his credit and
thereby became his creditors, as far as their rights inter sese are
concerned but not as against general creditors of the broker.
Difficult questions will arise if a broker maintains a special
bank account for customers' free credit balances, as is the not
uncommon practice. Thus, a broker may deposit in a special
account all money received from customers on account of future
purchases or he may deposit therein money representing custo-
mers' free credit balances arising in other ways. 0 In the latter
situation deposits would not be made from money delivered by
particular customers to the broker but would be made either from
the broker's own funds or from funds arising from sales of securi-
ties of customers generally."
If the broker opens an account, and makes deposits therein,
for the benefit of customers who have free credit balances, he
might thereby create a trust for them if he intends that result.72
By depositing money in trust for customers the broker effects a
0 See footnote 29, supra.
70At the present time this is not a general practice among brokers.
This is a convenient method of setting aside money with which a broker
can meet customers' demands for cash on account of* their free credit
balances.
7"Under stock clearing practices similar to that of the New York Stock
Exchange it would be impossible to trace the proceeds of a specific sale of
securities. If after a particular day's trading the broker is "long," he may
have to pay out money even though he sold securities for a particular cus-
tomer. In this situation, a particular customer could not trace the pro-
ceeds of his securities. Even if the broker is "short" as a result of the
day's trading, money received through the clearing could not be shown to
be the proceeds of a particular sale of securities.
7"No formal declaration is necessary to create a trust in money or
personalty. "Any declaration, however informal. evincinq the intention
with sufficient clearness will have that effect." (Day v. Roth, (1858) 18
N. Y. 448, 453; see also Putnam v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., (1908) 191
N. Y. 166, 182, 83 N. E. 789, 793.) Nor need the declaration of trust be
communicated to the beneficiaries (Martin v. Funk, (1878) 75 N. Y. 134;
Matter of Brown, (1930) 252 N. Y. 366, 169 N. E. 612) or even to other
third persons (Restatement of the Law of Trusts, see. 23 comment c). The
mere act of depositing funds in the trust account would sufficiently indi-
cate the broker's intention to hold the chose in action, to-wit, his claim as
depositor against the bank, for the benefit of the customer in respect of
whose free credit balance the deposit was made (see United National Bank
v. Weatherby, (1902) 70 App. Div. 279, 283, 75 N. Y. S. 3, 6.) The
requisite identification of beneficiaries could be accomplished by the account
books of the broker.
With respect to the effect of paragraph (4) on the rights of tenants
in common, see footnote 56, supra.
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transfer of such fund to said customers for, the trust being passive,
legal title to the bank account vests in such customers.7
3
Whether the broker deposits customer's or his own funds
in the trust account, it would seem that all deposits or transfers,
made within four months of his bankruptcy and at a time when he
is insolvent, are voidable as preferential transfers under Section
60,74 if the customer benefited thereby had, at the time when the
deposit was made, reasonable cause to believe that the broker was
insolvent.75 Preferential and voidable deposits in special account,
73A true trust must include elements of management. Otherwise the
statute of uses immediately executes the trust and vests legal title in the
cestui (Matter of Sweeney, (1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 461, 279 N. Y. S. 927;
Long Branch Banking Co. v. Winter, (1933), 112 N. J. Eq. 218, 163 Atl.
903; Estate of Edwin Newman, Jr. (Surr. Ct. N.Y.) reported in N. Y. L. J.
Dec. 18, 1935, p. 2492) ; see also Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 69,
comment a; 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 206).
The fact that the deposit is held in trust for customers would not pre-
vent the broker from making withdrawals for purposes consistent with the
trust. In other words, he could withdraw money from the account to pay
directly to customers or to apply on the purchase price of securities ac-
quired for "trust customers" or to reimburse himself for money which he
has advanced for the foregoing purposes.
Nor does the trust character of the deposit entitle trust customers to
make withdrawals from the deposit. The depositary bank can properly pay
the funds to the trust customers only with the consent of the broker or
when compelled to do so by court order (Hemmerich v. Union Dime
Savings Institution, (1911) 144 App. Div. 413, 129 N. Y. S. 267; Day
v. Old Colony Trust Co., (1919) 232 Mass. 207, 122 N. E. 189).
U4Section 60a, b, e (5). But cf. possible constitutional objections men-
tioned at pp. 62-63, supra. See footnote 56 supra.
75It is not entirely clear that a deposit of cash in a separate account
for the benefit of customers constitutes a "transfer" by a broker which
must be set aside under the provisions of paragraph (5) rather than nulli-
fied solely by the provisions of paragraph (4). It can be said that it is
not necessary that the voidable portion of the deposit be "recovered" by
the trustee within the meaning of paragraph (5) on the ground that the
separate bank account will pass to the possession of the trustee upon the
bankruptcy of the broker. It might be urged therefore that the provi-
sions of paragraph (4) are sufficient to "undo" the voidable deposits and
to give title therein to the bankruptcy trustee. (It is assumed that para-
graphs (4) and (5) permit reclamation of cash; see p., et seq.
The determination of this problem is not solely of academic interest
since, if the provisions of paragraph (4) operate to set aside deposits made
by a broker within four months of his bankruptcy and at a time when he
is insolvent, the knowledge of the broker's insolvency by the customers for
whom such deposits were made, is immaterial, whereas if the deposit con-
stitutes a "transfer" which must be set aside under paragraph (5) the
trustee can recover only if such customers knew of the insolvency of the
broker.
Since "transfer" is not specially defined for the purposes of sec. 60e,
it would seem that the definition set forth in sec. 1 (30) should govern.
By that definition a declaration of trust of a bank account would con-
stitute a "transfer."
It may be argued that the trust customer's knowledge, or lack there-
of, of this fact is important at the time when the deposit was withdrawn
STOCKBROKERS' BANKRUPTCIES
made from customer's money, can be recovered by the bankruptcy
trustee for the benefit of the single and separate fund ;71 voidable
deposits, made from the broker's own funds, can be recovered
by the trustee for the general estate.
Where the trust account consists partly of voidable and partly
of non-voidable deposits, it is highly important to ascertain the
deposits against which subsequent withdrawals will be charged
in order to determine the property against which the bankruptcy
trustee may proceed, the balance in the trust account or the
money, and the proceeds thereof, withdrawn.
The situation where all the voidable deposits in the trust
account were made entirely from customers' money will be first
considered. Since recovery of such voidable deposits would bene-
fit the single and separate fund, the controversy here will be
between the trust customers for whom non-voidable deposits were
made, and members of the single and separate class of customers,
represented by the bankruptcy trustee. By force of sec. 60e, this
trust account really represents two trust funds, the non-voidable
deposits constituting a trust fund for such trust customers and
the voidable deposits constituting a trust fund for the single and
separate class.
If the broker, after making the voidable deposits, wrongfully
withdrew funds from the account and dissipated them, one of three
rules might conceivably be applied to ascertain the deposits
against which the wrongful withdrawals should be charged.
To begin with, the "first-in-first-out rule," established in the
famous Clayto;'s Case,77 might be used to charge withdrawals
and paid by the broker to, or for the benefit of, such customer. Yet the
transfer to said customer really occurred at the time of the deposit.
As a practical matter it may be exceedingly difficult for a bankruptcy
trustee to prove that a trust customer had knowledge of the insolvency of
the broker, especially since such customer might not even know that such
a deposit had been made for his benefit.
There would seem to be no method by which a trust could be created
in respect of customers' free credit balances which could not be avoided,
to some extent at least, by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. If such
trust account be regarded either as payment or as security for the obliga-
tion of the broker to the customer on account of such free credit balances,
such trust would be subject, as pointed out in the discussion, to the pro-
visions of Section 60. It is extremely doubtful whether such deposit could
operate as payment of customers' claims against the stockbroker on ac-
count of free credit balances. For it to do so, it would be necessary to
obtain the consent of the customer to accept the chose in action against
the depositary bank as complete satisfaction of his former claim against
the broker. See Day v. Roth, (1858) 18 N. Y. 448, 453; Hamer v. Sidway,(1891) 124 N. Y. 538, 549-550, 27 N. E. 256, 258.76Section 60e(5), footnote 35, supra.
77Devaynes v. Nobel, (1816) 1 Mer. 572.
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against deposits in the order in which the latter were made. That
principle, being designed to govern controversies between a bank
and a depositor, would seem to be wholly inapplicable to this
situation,"8 and its arbitrary application in this situation would
not rest upon any basis of fairness.79 However, the courts have
uniformly applied the rule of Clayton's Case to similar situations, °
under the former Act and, with but one exception,s have failed
to appreciate the real problem.
8 2
7sRestatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 202, comment n, declares:
"Where the trustee deposits in a single account funds held by him as
trustee under different trusts, and subsequently wrongfully withdraws and
dissipates a part of the deposit, the beneficiaries of the trusts are entitled
to share the balance of the deposit proportionately, regardless of the order
in which the deposits were made."
79It has been stated, even with respect to a bank's right to setoff,
that the application of the first-in-first-out doctrine is a rule applied by
courts of equity and its application must depend upon its justice in a given
situation. See Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 847, 851 and Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank,
(1930) 254 N. Y. 218, 232, 172 N. E. 475, 480.80The rule of Clayton's Case has been applied with respect to with-
drawals by a defalcating trustee from an account representing several trust
funds. Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1912)
194 Fed. 593; In re A. Bolognesi & Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1918) 254 Fed.
770; In re Walter J. Schmidt & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1923) 298 Fed. 314. See
also Bradford v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, (S.D. N.Y.
1938) 24 F. Supp. 28, 35 (not a bankruptdy case).81In In re Walter J. Schmidt & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1923) 298 Fed. 314,
Judge Hand at first refused to apply the rule in Clayton's Case or the
authority of the Empire State Surety Case, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1912) 194
Fed. 593, and in a very logical discussion declared that each trust fund
should suffer the loss pro rata. Subsequently, however, counsel called
his attention to the decision in In re Bolognesi & Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1918) 254 Fed. 770, which he acknowledged as a binding authority and
thereupon he modified his first opinion.
Where a trustee has wrongfully withdrawn funds from a trust account
and thereafter deposits his own money therein, it is held that he intends to
make restitution. In In re T. A. McIntyre & Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1910)
181 Fed. 960, the wrongful withdrawals of the trustee from the trust
account, which consisted of several trust funds, had exhausted all funds.
Subsequently he made deposits therein and the question was whether such
deposits, regarded as restitutions, should be considered a general restora-
tion in which all the defrauded cestuis should share ratably or whether it
should be treated as making good, in so far as possible, the separate funds
in the order in which they were abstracted. The Court held that it must
be assumed that the defalcating trustee intended to make a general restitu-
tion. This seems unfair in light of the rule charging wrongful withdrawals
against first deposits instead of charging them against all deposits pro rata.82To be sure, the application of Clayton's Case to this situation may
have certain merit. It would afford the easiest avenue for recovery of
preferences by the bankruptcy trustee since he could look solely to the
balance of the account if it equalled or exceeded the amount of voidable de-
posits. It is obvious that under the first-in-first-out rule deposits for trust
customers with non-voidable interests would have been first in. Further, by
throwing the loss primarily upon trust customers, this rule might be said
to carry out an underlying purpose of section 60e to eliminate, as far as
possible, priorities among customers inter sese, as indicated in footnote 29,
supra.
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Second, it might be urged that this problem is governed by
the rule of Knatchbull v. Hallett3 which holds that where a wrong-
doer mingles, in a bank account, his own funds with those of
another person and thereafter makes withdrawals from that ac-
count, the wrongdoer is presumed to have first withdrawn his own
funds."' This rule is inapplicable to the assumed case since, by
hypothesis, none of the money in the account belonged to the
broker. Hence, irrespective of the purposes for which the broker
may have withdrawn money from the trust account, he cannot be
deemed to have withdrawn his own money.
A third rule, and the proper one to apply to this situation,
would distribute the loss pro rata between trust customers, for
whom non-voidable deposits were made, and the single and sepa-
rate class. As already stated, such trust customers and the
single and separate class should be regarded as tenants in com-
mon in this trust account. It is equitable, therefore, to require
these tenants in common to share pro rata any loss resulting from
the dissipation of the account by the broker."5
831n re Hallett's Estate, (1878) 13 Ch. Div. 696.54The rationale often given for that doctrine is that it would have been
dishonest for the wrongdoer to withdraw the claimant's or beneficiary's
money, hence he must be presumed to have withdrawn the latter's money
last. That is, of course, pure fiction. The real reason for that rule is
that the wrongdoer, whatever his intent, should not be permitted, by taking
away a part of the fund, to deprive the claimant or beneficiary of his lien
on, or share of, the rest of the fund.
See Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled With
Other Money, (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125. There Scott states, at p. 130,
that the rule of Clayton's Case is wholly inapplicable in cases of wrongful
mingling of deposits to determine the relation between the wrongdoer and
the claimant. See also In re Kountze Bros., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1935) 79 F.(2d) 98; Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., (Ind. 1938) 12
N. E. (2d) 123; Blattmacher v. Brown, (1937) 163 Misc. Rep. 389, 295
N. Y. S. 936.
A claimant or beneficiary is held entitled to a lien for his claim to
the extent of the lowest intermediate balance in the account.
Subsequent deposits by the wrongdoer may have been intended to
operate as a restoration of the funds so withdrawn, in which case the
claimant has a lien for the amount of his money originally deposited by
the wrongdoer rather than only for the lowest intermediate balance.
15See footnotes 78 and 81, supra.
Where the broker uses the withdrawals to pay a trust customer in re-
spect of whose credit balance a non-voidable deposit was made, there would
be no need to ascertain what rule to apply with respect to the withdrawals
since the balance in the trust account would be sufficient for both the other
trust customers for whom non-voidable deposits were made and for the
single and separate fund.
Even where the broker pays the withdrawals to a trust customer for
whom a voidable deposit was made (and who consequently has no vested
right to the deposit under section 60e), the sole right of the bankruptcy
trustee to recover the voidable transfers for the benefit of the single and
separate fund is against the recipient of the withdrawal; he should have
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If all the voidable deposits in the trust account were made
from the broker's owzn funds, the controversy would be between
trust customers, for whom non-voidable deposits were made, and
general creditors, represented by the bankruptcy trustee. Al-
though the voidable deposits were intended by the broker to be
in trust for customers, nevertheless, in the contemplation of sec.
60e these deposits, not constituting non-voidable trust funds, re-
main funds of the broker to which his general creditors are
entitled.
In essence, therefore, this situation would seem to present a case
of trust funds mingledwith the trustee's individual funds in a
bank account. Consequently, if the broker, after making the
voidable deposits, wrongfully withdraws funds from the account
and dissipates them, the rule of Knatchbdl v. Hallett would
seem to govern and to place the burden of the withdrawals first on
the voidable deposits.8 6 General creditors, claiming through the
brokev, cannot object.8 7
Where voidable deposits in the trust account represent funds
no right to proceed against the trust account since it no longer includes
property belonging to such fund.
To illustrate the results which would be reached under the foregoing
rules, assume that a broker deposited in the trust account $1,000 prior
to four months of his bankruptcy; that within four months of his bank-
ruptcy and while insolvent he deposited $400, representing customers'
money; that subsequently he withdrew and dissipated $900. Under the
rule of Clayton's Case, the trust customers, whose rights to the fund arose
prior to four months of bankruptcy, would receive $100 and the single
and separate fund would get $500. Under the pro rata rule, such trust
customers would receive $400 and the fund $200.SIn re A. 0. Brown & Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1911) 189 Fed. 432.
8sSee American Sugar Refining Company v. Fancher, (1895) 145
N. Y. 552, 560, 40 N. E. 206, 208; Scott, The Right to Follow Money
Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 126.
If the broker pays such withdrawals to trust customers for whom non-
voidable deposits were made, no problem is created. See footnote 85,
supra.
Where the broker pays the withdrawals to or for the benefit of trust
customers for whom voidable deposits were made, the bankruptcy trustee's
sole right is against the recipients of the withdrawals so that trust cus-
tomers, whose deposits antedated the preference period, are entitled to be
paid in full. The broker must be deemed to have paid the trust customers,
first described, from the voidable deposits. Otherwise, he would have con-
verted the non-voidable deposits belonging to trust customers of the latter
type, and' the rule of Hallett's Case would be applicable.
To illustrate the application of these rules, assume that the broker de-
posited $1,000 in the trust account prior to four months of his bankruptcy;
that within four months of his bankruptcy and at a time while he is in-
solvent he deposited therein $500 from his own funds; that subsequently he
withdrew and dissipated $600. Under the rule of Clayton's Case trust cus-
tomers would receive $400 and the general estate $500. Under the rule of
Knatchbull v.-Hallett, trust customers would receive $900 and the general
estate nothing.
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belonging partly to the broker and partly to customers, the prob-
lem becomes more complicated. Claims to this account would
then involve controversies between three distinct classes of per-
sons: customers whose interests in the account are vested as far as
Section 60e is concerned, members of the single and separate class,
and general creditors.
If the broker wrongfully withdrew money from this trust
account and dissipated it, it would seem equitable to apply the
rule of Kvatchbull v. Hallett as between general creditors and all
customers so as to place the loss primarily upon the former, and
then to regard trust customers for whom non-voidable deposits
were made in the account, as tenants in common with members of
the single and separate class and to impose the remaining loss
upon them pro rata.8 s
If the claims of trust customers are not satisfied in full from
the trust account, they would be entitled to participate with other
customers in the single and separate fund, and then, if their
claims and those of other customers are not satisfied therefrom,
all customers may then participate in the general estate, along with
general creditors, to the extent of the unpaid balance of their
clainis. s0
CONCLUSION
On the whole, sec. 60e constitutes a considerable and worth-
while advance over the old law. It has completely destroyed the
old classifications'between customers inter sese based upon such
fortuitous circumstances as (a) whether particular securities re-
mained in the possession of the broker at the date of his bank-
ruptcy 0 and (b) whether the broker, in dealing with his cus-
tomers' securities, had rightfully or wrongfully disposed of
them."' The new statute also makes a clean cut distinction be-
8eTo illustrate the application of the formulae in the situation last de-
scribed, assume that the broker deposited $1,000 in the trust account prior
to four months of his bankruptcy and. within four months of bankruntcy
and Pt a time when he is insolvent, $500 of his own money and $500 of
customers' money and that later he withdrew and converted $800. The rule
of Hallett's Case would be applied as between all customers and the gen-
eral credftors; in other words, it will be assumed that the broker first with-
drew his own money. Thus, general creditors would get nothing. As to
the balance of the account, trust customers for whom non-voidable de-
posits were made, and customers entitled to participate in the single 'and
separate fund would share as tenants in common to the extent that their
money went into the account, that is, $1.000 to $500 or 2 to 1. Thus, trust
customers would get $800 and the single and separate fund would get $400.8sSection 60e (2).
DOSee footnotes 21 and 23, supra.
91See footnote 19, supra.
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tween customers and general creditors of a broker and thereby
provides for an easy administration of stock brokerage bank-
ruptcies.
Many perplexing problems, however, may still exist in stock-
brokers' bankruptcies. As already pointed out in the discussion,
section 60e not only contains certain ambiguities but, in addition,
may overstep, in some particulars, the bounds of the federal bank-
ruptcy power and may violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Undoubtedly, serious controversies may arise as a
result of those difficulties. To make unnecessary the trouble and
expense of the litigation which might otherwise result, Congress
should speedily enact an amendment designed to answer these
problems.
